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Abstract: Conservation Areas (CAs) are among the most restrictive English planning 
policies. Designation implies a significant limitation of  owners’ control over the shape 
and appearance of  their properties. The policy, however, can also be argued to solve a 
sort of  ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, in which it might be collectively rational to preserve the 
character of  an area, but an individual homeowner may be tempted to inappropriately 
alter their property, thus free-riding on nearby properties’ character. The net benefit of  the 
policy depends largely on the existence of  positive ‘heritage effects’ and acknowledgement 
from homeowners that policy contributes to neighbourhood stability and the preservation 
of  these positive effects. Our results of  a mixed-method analysis of  close to 1 million 
property transactions near to about 8000 CAs and 111 interviews with residents in nine 
representative CAs in Greater London suggest that positive heritage externalities exist 
and that residents in CAs tend to value their local environments, acknowledge the need for 
planning control, and execute their right to object to neighbour’s planning request.
Keywords: designation, social relation of  value, heritage, property value, prisoner’s 
dilemma
1 Introduction
 “The Government is committed to ensuring that the planning system does everything it 
can to support sustainable economic growth. Planning should operate to encourage and 
not act as an impediment to sustainable growth. Therefore significant weight should be 
placed on the need to support economic growth through the planning system.”
DCLG (2012, page 6)
Planning in England has experienced a thirty-year history of neoliberalisation, which has 
sometimes obviously and other times subtly moved it away from its postwar Keynesian roots 
towards a form more at home with the imperative of growth (Allmendinger, 2011; Haughton 
et al, 2013; Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2012; Thornley, 1993). This has led some authors to 
claim that we are stuck in a growth-dependent paradigm for planning (Rydin, 2013). Given 
the above quote from the Department of Communities and Local Government and recent 
pronouncements from the Treasury in The Plan for Growth (HM Treasury, 2011), which 
seeks to further curtail planning power, the trajectory of planning in England seems fixed 
and our options appear limited. However, in this paper we argue that there are more complex 
ways in which markets and regulation interact and that understanding how value emerges in 
and through socioeconomic relations can provide key insights into the practice of value and 
the value of regulation.
Regulation and the market are frequently set up as antagonistic and mutually exclusive 
entities where any increase in performance of one necessarily implies an underperformance 
in the other through a sort of Polanyian double movement of market liberalism on the one 
hand and social reform on the other (Brenner et al, 2010; Hayek, 1960; Peck et al, 2009). 
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Here activities like town planning with its focus on the control of land markets and its attempts 
to ex-ante pin down and regulate locally held values creates an excellent opportunity to 
explore this supposed binary relationship between the self-regulating market and societally 
imposed, market-limiting safeguards. In this paper we challenge the notion that planning 
and markets must, through necessity, be antagonistic toward one another and argue that local 
people can value both the market and regulation in a mutually reinforcing way. We do this 
through a case study of Conservation Areas (CAs) in London where we observe the manner 
in which coordination problems arise and are overcome. We begin by viewing these problems 
through the lens of rational choice and the classic game of the prisoner’s dilemma which, 
though useful as a tool for understanding why coordination problems may emerge, is limited 
in its treatment of agency and offers only a partial view of why residents might value both the 
market and regulation (Barnes and Sheppard, 1992; Sayer, 2000). We therefore incorporate 
an understanding of how value emerges in and through concrete, relational socioeconomic 
practice to build a more complex awareness of the problem (Lee, 2006; 2011). This paper 
therefore seeks to unravel the notions of the growth imperative and regulation illustrating 
how people can value both the market for the validation of value that it produces through 
the exchange process and regulation for the coordination benefits it brings and the localised 
values it upholds.
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we examine the tensions that seemingly 
exist between planning and the imperative of economic growth and efficiency. We then 
introduce in section 3 the coordination problem in heritage conservation as an example where 
regulation is not an antagonist to but a potential means of achieving economic efficiency. In 
section 4, we substantiate the existence of this coordination problem via a property analysis 
that focuses on nonmarket heritage externalities. We then turn our attention in section 5 to the 
results of our quantitative and qualitative survey, which reveals not only how homeowners 
value and utilise regulation but also move beyond its strictures as part and parcel of what 
they hold to be of value. In section 6 we draw our conclusions highlighting that the varying 
practices of value that our research illuminates underscore that ex-ante regulation that seeks 
to pin down local values does not have to run counter to the market, but instead can allow for 
exchange and value creation, all the while permitting more multiple and complex economic 
practices to exist.
2 Planning regulation and growth
Planning regulation and the desire for economic growth have been uneasy bedfellows over 
the last forty years (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005; Ellickson, 1977; Evans, 1991; Evans, 
2003). Indeed, political discourses against regulation and a rhetoric that has favoured an 
economy based on profit maximisation above other social constructions of value (Lee, 2011) 
have led some scholars to contend that, in the English context, we have become reliant 
on a growth-dependent model of planning (Rydin, 2013). Certainly, given that the current 
Coalition government’s National Planning Policy Framework is dedicated to “ensuring that 
the planning system does everything it can to support sustainable economic growth” and 
“not act as an impediment to it” (DCLG, 2012; page 6), growth seems a central factor in the 
steady evolution of planning away from its Keynesian roots towards a form more at home 
with the imperatives and values of the market. This shift has left planners and planning with 
a narrowing of horizons and a limitation to imagining the ‘possible’ in practice (Haughton 
et al, 2013). It has also rendered market logics and market models preeminent in the minds 
of politicians who continue to see the ex-ante pinning down or fixing of value(s) through 
regulation as counterproductive, leading some scholars to go so far as to recommend the 
introduction of price signals into planning decisions so that planning learns “to work with as 
well as against markets” (Cheshire, 2013, page 186; Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005).
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Heritage planning, or the ability of the government to restrict property owners’ rights 
without compensation to alter or demolish structures deemed valuable to society, came about 
by an accretion of policy from the 1882 Ancient Monument’s Protection Act to the 1953 
Historic Buildings and Monuments Act, which set up the current system for the listing and 
preservation of individual buildings. The 1967 Civic Amenities Act extended this to areas 
which could be statutorily described as having “special architectural or historic interest, 
the character or appearance of which is desirable to preserve or enhance” (1967 Act, §1). 
As such, CAs represent England’s attempt to protect not simply individual buildings of 
historic importance but also groups of buildings, streetscapes, trees, and open spaces that 
form significant sites of local character. CAs came into being at a time punctuated by slum 
clearance and comprehensive redevelopment, which many have argued helped to spur the 
development of the legislation (Townshend and Pendlebury, 1999) in an attempt to quell 
market forces by pinning down an understanding of what was collectively valuable. Since 
1967 some 9800 areas have been designated in England, making the policy a significant 
aspect of local planning.
CAs are created at the local level and are designated by local planning authorities 
(LPAs) employing local or regional criteria. These criteria therefore vary across the country, 
allowing the ‘value’ attached to heritage to be culturally interpreted through specific sites 
and places (Pendlebury, 2009) highlighting the complexity of value(s) so aptly described 
by Lee (2006). In practice this means that CAs can range from masterplanned communities 
like Hampstead Garden Suburb to open spaces like Richmond Park to attractive areas of 
suburbia to modernist housing estates. Each of these very different, locally defined places 
are then afforded protection under national planning legislation and advice issued by central 
government, thus reflecting the wider interests of society pinned down via regulation.
Across England, owners of properties in CAs typically receive no special grants 
or assistance for the upkeep and maintenance of their properties. Once an area has been 
designated, alterations to individual properties require ‘Conservation Area Consent’ (CAC) 
thus limiting what owners may do with their properties. It is a criminal offence to totally 
or substantially demolish any building within a CA without first seeking consent from the 
LPA. In cases where alterations to the property require planning permission, owners are 
also required to apply for CAC and applications are determined based on the enhancement 
and protection of the area. In some circumstances householders are allowed to make certain 
small alterations to their buildings without the need for planning permission. However, these 
alterations may be construed as detrimental to the fabric of CAs and are therefore partially 
or wholly restricted. Householders therefore must apply for permission to install certain 
types of cladding, roof extensions, and side and rear extensions of more than one storey 
and satellite dishes and antennae that are visible from the highway. In addition, the General 
Planning and Development Order gives LPAs and the secretary of state the right to further 
withdraw permitted development rights under Article 4 directives. In these cases, LPAs are 
able to require permission to be sought for alterations such as building a porch, removing a 
chimney, or replacing windows and exterior doors. As of 2009 some 13% of CAs in England 
were under the added protection of Article 4 directives (English Heritage, 2009). Despite the 
restrictive nature of CA policy, one of its striking features is how accepted it has become in 
England (Pendlebury, 2009; page 1) as an ex-ante attempt to pin down collectively defined 
notions of where value comes from, how it should be evaluated, and how value should be 
practised.
However, this public acceptance is not without its critics. Eversley (1973), for example, 
worried that conservation policy blocked progress and renewal in cities, elevating the tastes 
of a small minority above those of the average citizen. This fear that conservation is simply a 
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trope for elite ideals and understandings of cultural heritage and is therefore exclusionary has 
also been played out in a variety of national contexts from the Americas to China (Ley, 1995; 
Osman, 2011; Shin, 2010; Smith, 2006). It has also been criticised by the political Right on 
free-market terms as a means of smothering people “with bureaucratic instructions limiting 
their freedom” (cited by Larkham and Barrett, 1998, page 57) and more recently by Glaeser 
(2010; 2011) as a market-hampering mechanism, which restricts land supply and leads to 
rising house prices and affordability problems. Further such critiques about CAs are echoed 
in current debates in England regarding the preservation of greenbelt land and its relationship 
to higher house prices in the southeast (Cheshire, 2013; Overman, 2013). In both instances 
we see policies that regulate the market and, in theory at least, stand in the way of growth.
3 Conservation Areas and coordination problems
Conservation policy in England may have escaped, as Allmendinger and Thomas (1998) argue, 
the most stringent pushes of deregulation sought by successive rounds of neoliberalisation 
in planning, perhaps, as Pendlebury (2009) asserts, underpinned by the immediate economic 
value that can be created through heritage commodification. However, it still represents 
a significant intrusion into the functioning of free-market principles and the free exercise 
of property rights by homeowners. Thus we might assume that homeowners would be 
resistant to regulation and see little value in its implementation. However, as our findings 
demonstrate, the story is far more complex. Importantly, we argue that conservation policy 
is less at odds with the imperative of market efficiency than it might initially seem. As we 
demonstrate, there is an evident coordination problem, which provides an economic rationale 
for regulation and at the same time makes it less likely that homeowners will be resistant to 
regulation. However, not only did our homeowners value and utilise regulation, they also 
moved beyond it to reinforce their own understandings of what was valuable about their 
CAs. The residents in our survey are not simply seeing regulation as a rod. Regulation is 
being valued as an integral asset that helps support the multiple ways in which CAs are being 
valued across time and place.
One way of characterising the coordination problem is a sort of prisoner’s dilemma 
whereby all those living inside an historic district benefit from localised heritage amenity 
but individual property owners may be tempted to inappropriately alter or not adequately 
maintain their properties thus ‘free-riding’ on the overall character of the area (Coulson 
and Lahr, 2005). Historic preservation then represents an instance where, in game-theory 
terms, a coordination problem exists between private and common interest (Rand et al, 
2009, page 272). Here all parties could gain from the conservation of their neighbourhood 
through heightened amenity and raised property values, but in order to realise this gain 
residents are required to make mutually consistent decisions about the alteration and upkeep 
of their properties. The situation corresponds to the standard welfare economics problem 
where a nonpecuniary externality that cannot be traded on an economic market leads to 
a misallocation of resources since external costs and benefits are not taken into account 
in the market equilibrium (Scitovsky, 1954). Under this scenario heritage amenity would 
be a common pool resource that is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. This means that the 
use of the resource by one actor does not preclude its use by another, nor is it possible to 
exclude individuals from using the resource (Samuelson, 1954). Given these characteristics, 
the effect of individual actions on others (externality) is nonpecuniary and cannot be traded 
on (economic) markets, thereby producing a market failure. Any externality will remain 
unconsidered in a market equilibrium that resembles the Nash equilibrium in the sense that it 
is individually rational, but cooperation would be welfare maximizing (collectively rational). 
The lack of an economic market corresponds to the physical separation of the actors in 
the prisoner’s dilemma, which makes the cost of coordination prohibitive. While in theory 
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coordination could emerge if the cost of cooperation was low even in the absence of a policy 
(Calabresi and Melamed, 1972), it is, in practice, arguably unlikely that this scenario applies 
to areas anywhere near to the size of an average conservation area. We provide detailed 
applications of the prisoner’s dilemma concept to the case of heritage conservation alongside 
a discussion of coordination costs and free-riding incentives in the methodological appendix.
4 Heritage externalities and revealed value
The essential precondition for a coordination problem to emerge along the lines just described 
is the existence of positive heritage externalities within CAs. By definition it is not possible 
to directly observe market prices that reflect the value of nonmarket externalities. A popular 
approach to the valuation of public goods is to exploit revealed preferences that materialise 
on economic markets that indirectly relate to a public good in question. A typical example is 
the economic valuation of nonmarket spatial externalities based on capitalisation effects in 
property prices. A great deal of research has concentrated on property price premiums within 
conservation areas or historic districts, typically finding positive effects (eg, Koster et al, 2012; 
Leichenko et al, 2001). Fewer studies have focused on spatial variation within or outside to 
detect heritage externalities (eg, Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2010; Coulson and Lahr, 2005).
Our quantitative analysis started from the conventional assumption in spatial economics 
that property prices reflect all the costs and benefits owners derive from the location of their 
property. The overall net benefits to owners of properties in CAs can be distinguished into 
heritage and policy effects. Benefits include the pleasure of living in a building with certain 
historic and aesthetic features (internal heritage effect) or near to buildings with similar 
characteristics (external heritage effect). In addition, the legal status of designation brings 
the benefit of reduced uncertainty regarding the future of the neighbourhood and the cost 
of increased planning control: that is, development restrictions and maintenance obligations 
( policy effect). Since we were interested primarily in the nonmarket heritage externality we 
focused on comparing how prices changed at different distances from a CA boundary, both 
internally and externally. The rationale for such an analysis is that we assume the internal 
heritage effect and the policy effect to exist inside CAs alone and to be constant within 
a given CA. The external heritage effect can then be concluded from spatial variation in 
prices within and outside CAs assuming that the strengths of the heritage externality must be 
lower at locations further away from a CA (larger external distance) and higher at locations 
closer to the centre of a CA (larger internal distance). To conduct this analysis we merged 
1088 446 property transactions provided by the Nationwide Building Society with 8167 CAs 
in GIS. English Heritage provided the exact boundaries of the CA in the form of an electronic 
map (shapefile). In the econometric analysis we utilised 830 055 transactions, which were 
within 2 km of 7737 CAs. The remaining transactions and CAs remained unconsidered in 
the analysis. To separate the external heritage effects from potentially correlated factors we 
made use of a comprehensive dataset that allowed us to hold constant a wide variety of 
observable property and locational characteristics. Moreover, our statistical analysis was 
designed to provide a comparison within a 2 km distance from a CA within a given year. All 
unobservable factors that influence property prices in such a relatively small area within a 
certain year were, thus, controlled for. A detailed description of the empirical specification 
and data used is provided in the methodological appendix.
We found that prices clearly decline from the centre of the area towards the boundary and 
decline even further from the edge of the area outwards. The CA premium at the boundary 
(0–50 m) of 9.5% roughly doubles once the innermost zone is reached (inside the CA, but 
more than 450 m from the boundary). This increase in value is in line with a positive external 
heritage effect as heritage density increases as one approaches the centre of the CA. Just 
outside the CA (0–50 m) there is still a significant premium of close to 5% cent. This external 
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premium declines in distance and becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0 at about 
600 m (see figure 1). Again, this spatial trend is in line with a positive external heritage effect 
as the benefit of being close to a CA should be associated with both its relative visibility and 
‘visitability’ from the affected property. This spatial scope of the effect is very similar to the 
evidence provided by Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2010), who detect heritage externalities within 
a range of about 600 m, though in a different institutional context (Berlin, Germany).
The discontinuity at the boundary can be attributed either to an internal heritage effect, 
or to a highly localised external heritage effect or a policy effect. If anything, the relatively 
large and positive discontinuity at the boundary indicates that the potentially negative policy 
effects associated with a location in a CA on property values are relatively small compared 
with the internal and external heritage benefits. More importantly for the purpose of our 
analysis, we interpret the evident spatial trends within and near to the CA boundaries as 
strong evidence of a positive external heritage effect. These benefits help us to establish why 
a coordination problem may exist with respect to CAs.
5 Cooperative behaviour and generation of value
The external heritage effect, a nonmarket externality, sets the stage for the prisoner’s dilemma 
(Coulson and Lahr, 2005). To better understand how and if coordination emerged in CAs 
we took a case-study approach examining a representative sample of nine CAs in London 
through quantitative and qualitative techniques. Selection was guided by the hedonic analysis 
and is predicated on property price premia (high/low), location in Greater London (Inner/
Outer), and relative deprivation (higher/lower) as described by the 2007 Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation. We also examined areas with varying levels of planning restriction in the form 
of Article 4 Directions and areas with and without active amenity societies (see table 1).
We surveyed 111 residents, including homeowners and private and social renters, in 
our nine CAs. Surveys were conducted face-to-face and the sample was drawn such that 
homeowners, renters, and those residents who had applied for planning permission in 
their current residences were represented. There were fifty-three questions in the survey 
covering topics ranging from level of community involvement, attitudes toward the area in 
Figure 1. Internal and external Conservation Area (CA) effects. Black solid (dashed) lines show point 
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terms of likes and dislikes, attitudes toward the planning system, experiences with planning 
applications, and experiences with objecting to applications. Questions were both multiple 
choice and discursive allowing for longer responses to gauge more fully resident’s opinions 
about living in their neighbourhood and about planning regulation. The quantitative data 
from these interviews were input into Stata and analysed. We also conducted interviews with 
local council conservation officers and other property professionals across our nine CAs 
and more extensively across London. All interviews were recorded and transcribed so that 
verbatim quotes could be used and data triangulated to ensure rigour. At all stages anonymity 
was assured and informed consent gained from our interviewees [see Ahlfeldt et al (2012) 
for more detail].
5.1 Valuing neighbourhoods
We argue that, in order for cooperation to emerge, residents must have an awareness of 
the added value of the characteristics of their neighbourhood and respond accordingly. Here 
the dimensions along which ‘value’ materialises are manifold. Firstly, the capitalisation 
effects discussed in section 4 witness heightened amenity value that are specific to the areas 
deemed heritage rich, be the value related to aesthetic character and integrity, neighbourhood 
stability or identity. Property value, however, is not only reflective of the utility buyers and 
sellers derive from such favourable locational attributes. Because property is typically the 
largest asset in a homeowner’s portfolio, it constitutes a major component of household’s 
wealth and liquidity (Fischel, 2001). In this sense, property value can be seen as both a cause 
and an effect of economic utility. As such, owners, as utility maximisers, will care about the 
value that preservation brings to their properties (Henrich et al, 2001). However, as previously 
mentioned in our hedonic analysis, it is not possible to directly observe market prices that 
reflect the value of nonmarket externalities. It is also not possible to understand how value is 
being valued simply by examining prices (Lee, 2006; 2011). We contend that, since value 
is produced through both economic and non-economic relations, we cannot simply distil 
economic activity to metrics of economic growth and monetary reward. We must also consider 
the everyday evaluation of value caught up in the ordinariness of socioeconomic practice 
where self-interest and economic utility play a part, but a part “defined and practiced in 
socially variable ways” (Lee, 2006; page 414). In this way we utilise our survey and interview 
data to unpick the multiple and diverse ways in which residents valued their neighbourhoods. 
Table 1. Case study selection criteria.





high De Beauvoir (Hackney) yes yes
low Ladbroke (Royal Borough 
of Kensington and Chelsea)
yes in part
low high St Mark’s (Hackney) yes in part
low Courtfields (Royal Borough 




high Brentham Gardens (Ealing) yes yes
low Sheen Road (Richmond) no in part
low high Bowes Park (Haringey) yes no
low St Matthias (Richmond) no in part
Outside 
London
low Overcliffe (Gravesham) no yes
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We asked our interviewees both to rate the physical attractiveness and distinctiveness of 
where they lived and to discursively explain what elements of their neighbourhood they held 
as dear.
For our survey, residents were asked to describe their neighbourhoods as distinctive on 
a five-point scale where 1 was very distinctive and 5 was not distinctive at all. Here 70% 
of respondents across the nine areas viewed their neighbourhood as either very distinctive 
or distinctive, indicating that there was a general valuation amongst residents that the 
area was special in some way. We also gave those surveyed the opportunity to compare 
their neighbourhood with neighbouring districts, describing the physical attractiveness 
of their area, again on a five-point scale. The results show that over 60% of residents believed 
that their neighbourhood was either much more attractive or more attractive relative to other 
nearby districts, again indicating that residents evaluated their areas as somehow unique.
Whilst these data lay down an initial picture of our CAs, they do not tell us much as 
to what aspects of the neighbourhoods were viewed as distinctive or attractive. When asked 
what interviewees most valued about their neighbourhood, three core themes emerged across 
all of the areas surveyed. These were: community cohesion (or neighbourliness), the quality 
of the environment (eg, green space, trees, and tranquillity) and the value of the built heritage. 
These echo earlier findings on what residents valued in inner-urban conservation areas in 
Tyne and Wear (Pendlebury, 2002; Townshend and Pendlebury, 1999).
Narratives around community featured most strongly in our high-deprivation CAs where 
interviewees talked about “feelings of belonging” which they often linked to areas being 
mixed in terms of social class. In Brentham Gardens residents associated this with the original 
“utopian ideal of connecting different sorts of families” via a very specific architectural vision 
founded on Garden City principles and through the existence of a strong and active local 
amenity society. In Inner London, residents also talked about social mix and the multicultural 
nature of their neighbourhoods. One De Beauvoir resident noted,
 “ It is a really mixed area with a very mixed social strata of people living here. I imagine 
in other CAs it is like all very rich people, but here there are lots of tenants, it is not 
all privately owned so there’s a lot of people from different social backgrounds and I 
like that.”
Whilst these attitudes were not universal in our high-deprivation CAs, with some residents 
speaking of crime and anti-social behaviour, for the majority, feelings of community 
cohesion featured prominently in their narratives of place. This finding was supported by 
our survey data, which showed strong inclinations toward community cohesion, with 40% 
of our residents belonging to a community group, over 35% knowing ten or more of their 
neighbours by name, and close to 80% agreeing that “most people can be trusted”.
A strong affinity with the local environment and architecture also emerged as significant 
in residents’ valuations of where they lived. Environmentally, a green, pleasant, and peaceful 
neighbourhood was discussed by a majority of our residents who frequently linked a notion 
of “neighbourhood feel” to both public and private green spaces within the CA boundaries. 
Architectural style and integrity also arose as an integral factor for residents’ valuations of 
their locale, most prominently in our high-deprivation high-premia CAs. Here residents in 
Brentham Gardens frequently mentioned the area’s “villagey feel”, which emerged from 
the cottage-style architecture prevalent in the CA. In De Beauvoir, an inner London CA, 
residents also typified the space as “being like a village” noting that the area’s architectural 
variety was “like English heritage … a typical English city landscape”. This level of affinity 
with local architectural styles by residents was also noted in interviews with local planning 
officers who commented on the high degree of community involvement in planning, which 
they linked to a strong sense of heritage and the built environment amongst residents.
180 N Holman, G M Ahlfeldt
Finally, residents were asked about their perception of the economic value of their areas 
and how being part of a CA might impact on this. More than 75% ranked their area as 
expensive or very expensive. On the basis of the answers we created an index of relative 
affordability by CA and compared the results with the price premium we estimated based 
on transactions in and around the respective CAs (see figure 2). The evidence suggests, that 
with the exception of Courtfields, owners were well aware of the overall economic value of 
their CA. Moreover, when asked if being in a CA had an impact on their individual property 
values, more than 80% of interviewees responded positively.
From these data we can begin to understand the multiple ways in which residents are 
valuing their CAs, and these valuations are different from place to place. This is important, for, 
whilst England provides a national framework for planning regulation, its local application 
is imperative in helping to maintain the local collective values of residents. Furthermore, our 
survey data reveal that the vast majority of residents in CAs are well aware that a price premium 
exists and that being in a CA has an impact on the value of their individual properties. These 
qualitative data reinforce the results of our hedonic analysis, by suggesting that somehow 
the coordination problem is being overcome. In the following subsection we explore how 
regulation is an integral factor in helping establish collectively rational behaviour.
5.2 Residents and regulation
In this subsection we argue that, to be effective in addressing coordination problems and 
avoid free-riding, residents must use the tools made available to them through planning 
policy, the strongest of these being the right to raise objections to planning applications. We 
found that just over 40% of residents surveyed had objected to a neighbour’s request for 
planning permission and this 40% remained constant when the areas were subdivided into 
high/low premium and high/low deprivation. Thus we can see residents utilising regulation 
as a way of enforcing collectively rational behaviour and pinning down local values.
Figure 2. Effective and self-reported (relative) price level. Owner’s rating is on a −2 to +2 scale. 
The CA (Conservation Area) premium is the nbt  coefficient recovered from separate regression for each 
CA n of the following type: CAD YEARPitn n nj nij nj t nija b p f= + + + , where CAD is a 0 or 1 indication 
for whether a transaction takes place within CA n, and YEAR refers to the year of transaction. Each 
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In our high-premium areas three factors emerged as significant when objections were 
made. The first, and perhaps most expected, was that residents object when they feel 
directly threatened by change. Here being overlooked, the loss of sunlight, or the disruption 
of a cherished view were the reasons most often mentioned for lodging an objection to 
a neighbour’s planning application. These reasons relate most strongly to the private 
enjoyment of personal property rather than to any sense of collectively held values based on 
the heritage or aesthetic quality the neighbourhood might have. This may seem to support 
a simple entangling and disentangling of price and self-interest made by a rational market 
actor; however, delving further into the interview data we see more multiple and complex 
valuation strategies emerging in our CAs.
Moving beyond simple individual self-interest, residents also reported objecting to 
a neighbour’s planning application based on concerns about the loss of heritage and area 
character, indicating that there were heritage narratives embedded in these CAs. Here 
objections included opposition to changes in the style or form of properties and to the removal 
of significant trees from the landscape. As one resident noted,
 “ It is a constant battle to keep the new developments in-line with the spirit of the area. 
My wife keeps an eye on all the applications and we object to those that would spoil the 
character of the area.”
Planning officers corroborated these views, noting that residents had a “heightened awareness 
of conservation” and were intent on “keeping the character of the area and stopping detrimental 
development”.
Moving beyond objections made by individual householders, we also saw collective 
patterns of objections emerging in our high-premia CAs. Here the role of amenity societies 
(groups dedicated to maintaining and enhancing the area’s heritage) and more generalised 
neighbourhood pressure appeared to drive objections and alter applicant behaviour. For 
example, in Brentham Gardens several respondents mentioned the existence of the Brentham 
Society as an organisation responsible for raising objections to development where the 
character of the CA was neither enhanced nor protected. In Ladbroke interviewees discussed 
the vital role citizens played in reporting inappropriate development. As one resident stated, 
“Whilst the council is there to intervene in these matters, it is up to us as residents to report 
any breaches.” The same pattern held true for De Beauvoir, where conservation officers noted 
that the local amenity society and to a large extent the residents were their “eyes and ears” on 
the ground, often letting them know the “moment a ladder touched a building”. In fact, across 
our sample of CAs officers reported that amenity societies and residents were instrumental 
in mounting challenges to inappropriate development. This ‘eyes and ears’ function is vitally 
important, as English planning enforcement can be typified as being reactive and responsive 
rather than systematic and all encompassing, with a great deal of enforcement reliant upon 
the general public’s reporting of breaches (Harris, 2013).
In Ladbroke an even more interesting pattern emerged, with homeowners discussing 
the pressure they felt about altering their properties in ways that might be at odds with CA 
character. One interviewee told the story of a neighbour who had been given permission 
to change the roofline of her property but that neighbours felt that this would negatively 
impact the skyline near the garden square. She stated, “there was such pressure in the 
neighbourhood that despite the approval the person did not go ahead with the build.” 
Similarly, one conservation officer reported that residents frequently felt pressure to replace 
old wooden sash windows with new wooden sash windows rather than the cheaper uPVC type 
despite local regulation not requiring this. Here she noted that residents typically mimicked 
the behaviour of their neighbours in a sort of cultural reproduction that reflects a kind of 
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‘governmentality from below’,(1) that relies on amenity societies, self-reflection, and social 
ties to mobilise new forms of behaviour (Appadurai, 2000; Olson, 2008). These strategies are 
vital to the production of a culture that supports the integrity of the CA and helps to create 
cooperation amongst residents.
In our low-premium areas, whilst the propensity to object was as high, the reasoning 
behind objections was less well developed and articulated. Homeowners in our areas of 
low deprivation (Courtfields and St Matthias) provided the most articulated views on why 
they raised objections to planning applications in their neighbourhoods. These responses 
were an even mix between objections to an intensification of use in the form of commercial 
developments and flats, concerns about loss of light, and concerns about loss of character.
5.3 Residents’ attitudes about planning
Finally, for the system to be successful and the prisoner’s dilemma to be overcome there 
needs to be more than a simple willingness to object to a neighbour’s planning application. 
Residents must also believe that the system is functioning and fit for purpose and that the 
benefits they receive in the form of heightened property and amenity values outweigh the costs 
imposed by regulation. In our survey we asked residents if they viewed the constraints placed 
on property owners in the CA as a significantly negative attribute of the area. Just over 60% 
of the residents surveyed believed that the constraints were not negative, with just over 10% 
believing that they were. Interestingly, when we restricted the question to homeowners and 
divided these into those who had and had not applied for planning permission, we found 
a stronger tendency towards a belief that the constraints were not a burden (see figure 3). 
In addition, when asked if the planning system was the best mechanism for protecting the 
integrity of the area, just over 45% of those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed with less 
than 10% claiming that they disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. Again, 
when broken down by those residents who had applied for planning permission we find a 
more positive response amongst those former applicants (see figure 4). This would seem to 
indicate that residents, especially those who had applied for planning permission in the past, 
(1) Clearly this ‘governmentality from below’ does not refer to the mobilisation of the poor; it does 
reflect more broadly a shared understanding of how regulation is conducted.
Figure 3. Constraints on property owners. Homeowners who had ever applied for planning permission 
relating to their current residence were asked whether constraints on property owners in Conservation 
Areas are a significant negative attribute of the area.
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considered the constraints both acceptable and necessary, which runs counter to what one 
might expect of a purely opportunistic market actor. This phenomenon could, in part, be 
simply down to a willingness to preserve or enhance the high property value that is typically 
found in conservation areas (as seen in our hedonic analysis). However, as indicated above, 
our research shows that there are more multiple values at work: that is, an appreciation of local 
character or identity. The high property value would then not be a cause but a consequence 
of cooperative behaviour. We now turn to our interview data to unpick the attitudes driving 
behaviour.
The interview data revealed a consistent picture with residents quick to comment on 
the importance of protecting CAs. They spoke of “holding the line” against “an erosion” 
or “chipping away” of “architectural integrity” mostly discussed around vague notions of 
architectural styles or “area characteristics” generally typified as “village like” and green. 
They linked their current environments to a sense of reassurance they found embedded in 
“our national story” and our “relationship with the past” often citing their appreciation for the 
Georgian or Victorian characteristics of their properties. This seemed to flow from a belief 
that, as one resident put it, “as a nation we have a tradition in decent architecture and design”. 
They also noted that, if left to the individual, the temptation to alter properties inappropriately 
due to a desire to develop more intensely for private gain or more cheaply for economy 
would be too great. Even when planning permission had been denied to an owner we found 
several occasions where interviewees reflected on the overall reasonableness of the decision. 
As noted by one resident, “So, it was a decision that went against us as individuals, but I 
thought that it was probably correct in a more overall perspective.” These comments were 
further strengthened by a homeowner who reflected that the local council put in a great deal 
of effort and resources to help preserve local heritage, which in her words helped residents 
develop “an overall mind-set towards heritage”. When asked to comment specifically about 
the utility of the planning system, the overwhelming majority of residents stated that they 
“could see no alternative to the current system” and that regulation was vital to preventing 
‘others’ from altering properties inappropriately.
What is interesting in the above account is a certain consistency in reasoning around 
both why it is important to protect CAs and how it might be best to do this. When given 
Figure 4. Approval for the planning system. Homeowners who had ever applied for planning 
permission relating to their current residence were asked whether the planning system is the best 
mechanism with which to protect this integrity.
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the opportunity to discuss why they believed conservation was important, most residents 
harkened back to a sense of cultural norms around beauty and architectural integrity with 
words like cottage, village, Victorian, and English. These “social relations of value offer(ed) 
them a framework of evaluation” that was not, for the most part, predicated on economic self-
maximisation (Lee, 2006, page 419). Similarly, the planning system was valued primarily 
as a tool to maintain area integrity and prevent the practice of other value(s) they saw as 
running counter to conservation. What residents saw and practised as value(s) was clearly 
more complex than a simple metric that measured the relative price of their property and how 
their neighbours might impact on this. The high property values in CAs, thus, were more 
likely the result of coordination to preserve the multiplicity of values than the actual driving 
force behind cooperative effects.
6 Escaping the dilemma?
Literature on valuing built heritage often approaches the question from either the point 
of view of the financial impact that designation has on property (Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 
2010; Diaz et al, 2008; Koster et al, 2012; Leichenko et al, 2001; Zahirovic-Herbert and 
Chatterjee, 2012) or as a window into meanings of heritage and its value as a public policy 
goal (Lowenthal, 1985; 1996; Pendlebury, 2009; Townshend and Pendlebury, 1999). These 
more binary approaches obscure deeper understandings of the multiple values practised in 
ordinary economic geographies. In our paper we have sought to redress this by combining 
quantitative econometric models of property price analysis with qualitative perceptions into 
local derivations and understanding and practices of value. In so doing, the paper offers 
unique insights into conservation planning and the production of cooperative behaviour, 
which could not be achieved by solely a qualitative or quantitative approach.
So, what can this study tell us about planning for heritage conservation and, more 
importantly, what broader lessons can we learn about the practice of value(s) and the 
production of cooperative behaviour? In the first instance, it is clear that heritage externalities 
(as shown in our hedonic analysis) do exist in CAs and that these can motivate regulation that 
endeavours to correct individually rational but collectively destructive behaviour through the 
establishment of legal rules and standards. As we have demonstrated, the policy creates a 
framework in which residents are able to act in order to coordinate their behaviour in a more 
favourable way. We have also shown that residents do not see regulation as a rod; rather, they 
have faith in the planning system, utilising it frequently to help pin down locally held values. 
In addition, counter to any strict sense of profit-maximising behaviour, residents can and do 
go beyond the mere legal scope of the regulation in both spirit and practice even when this 
conflicts with their own personal interests. Here we saw some residents choosing not to act in 
a way that could be considered detrimental to local heritage values even when these actions 
would be allowed within the scope of regulation. All of this would appear to support the idea 
that regulation helps to correct individually rational but collectively irrational behaviour.
The question that remains is what drives cooperative behaviour in practice. As we have 
shown, property values in CAs are typically high and the majority of our residents were 
aware of this. Is the cooperative behaviour driven by the desire to maximise the value of 
property in order to realise an economic gain in the form of higher wealth and liquidity? Or 
does cooperation arise more from a desire to preserve local characteristics like architectural 
integrity, neighbourliness, and ‘community feel’? Because all of these values eventually 
materialise in property value it is notoriously difficult to distinguish the motives behind 
cooperation. However, our qualitative analysis offers novel insights into this behaviour. 
None of our residents directly mentioned property value in the form of economic gain as a 
reason to promote regulation and some arguably invested more time and money in their areas 
than could immediately be recouped in a sale price. What we see in our case studies is that 
The coordination problem in heritage preservation 185
residents derived value and valued regulation not for its price effects but rather for a series 
of multiple and complex notions of value based around aesthetics, amenity, integrity, and the 
joy (however described) of living in a community (again however described).
Here we see varying practices of value emerging within quotidian ordinary economies, 
which illustrate that ex-ante regulation that seeks to pin down local values does not have 
to run counter to the market, but can instead allow for exchange and value creation, all the 
while permitting more multiple and complex economic practices to exist. This has serious 
implications for the current trend towards deregulation in planning, as it should give us pause 
to consider what we may lose if reforms to the system run ahead of honest evaluations of what 
we also gain from regulation. In this sense, we offer to the field of economic geography and 
planning a wider more complex view of value(s) as it is practised in the ordinary economy, 
which moves beyond a simple growth dependent paradigm upon which planning currently 
appears to be wed.
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